Introduction
Over the last decade or so, the EU's external policies -now officially and rather inelegantly called "external action" -have grown in ambition, scope and stature. The trajectory is neither unproblematic nor linear. It is clear that some external policies work better than others, and that the EU's constitutional ambition, as expressed in the Treaties, is difficult to realize. The overall tendency is clear, though. The EU -which when it comes to external policies is best understood as a conglomerate of the EU institutions and the Member States -seeks to become an ever more significant global actor, 1 not just in the economic field but across and beyond the range of its internal competences and policies. Indeed, the fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) cannot be equated to the external projection of an internal policy; nor is that the case for the EU's external human rights policy.
The Lisbon Treaty was a scarcely veiled attempt to further constitutionalize the founding Treaties. As regards external action, that Treaty clearly constitutes the apex of the EU's constitutional and policy ambition -utopian at best, in the eyes of most. 2 It is worth recalling here the mere Treaty summary, in Article 3(5) TEU, of what the EU hopes to achieve in the wider world (the full version is in Article 21 TEU):
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
It is easy to denigrate such utopian ambition. Yet this is a fundamental Treaty provision, and it is cast in mandatory terms: the EU shall uphold and promote its values and interests. This paper seeks to inquire into the meaning of this Treaty obligation, in particular as regards some of the values generally underpinning the EU's internal market, and the rules and principles concerning services of general interest in particular. It is structured in three parts. The first offers a mapping exercise of the relevant Treaty provisionsseeking to establish connections and ways of reading them so that they may "inform" each other. The second puts them in the context of the debate about
Normative Power Europe (NPE) -a much used, but not undisputed international relations concept coined to express the nature of the EU's external policies and projection. 3 The third inquires further into the "normative" nature and effect of the EU's constitutional values and objectives.
I will argue that the Treaty normative basis for the EU's external relations is meaningful and is to be taken seriously.
Mapping the Treaties
Reference was made above to Article 3(5) TEU, which sets out the EU's objectives "in its relations with the wider world". on "Solidarity" (Title IV), mostly concerned with social rights, but including Article 36 on "Access to services of general economic interest":
The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union.
This provision is not of course formulated as a human or fundamental right, and the Charter, as is well known, operates a cumbersome distinction between "rights" and "principles". where they "risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity"; and in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where they "risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them".
It may be useful to sum up the main findings of this mapping exercise:
• in its external action the EU is subject to an obligation to uphold and promote its own values;
• those values include respect for human rights in a society in which solidarity prevails;
• the EU Charter lists access to services of general economic interest as a fundamental right, under the heading of solidarity;
• the principle of solidarity must be promoted as one of the express goals of EU external action;
• the EU's internal market is described as a highly competitive social market economic and services of general economic interest are part of it, occupying a place in the shared values of the EU;
• EU exclusive competence extends to international trade in services, but the decision-making provisions recognize that the liberalization of certain services is sensitive; and the common commercial policy must respect the principles and objectives of EU external action. But it could also be seen as a duty to respect and protect such services elsewhere, in third countries.
Further reflection is of course needed on the normative "thickness" of the It is not the purpose of this paper to offer a full analysis of the concept of NPE, and the debate pertaining to it among international relations scholars. I
should merely like to note the remarkable convergence between this concept and the process of constitutionalization of the EU's values and objectives, in the sphere of its external action. This convergence can be illustrated with a brief aperçu of some of Manners's observations, analyses and concepts, as set out in his seminal article. His main aim was to move away from the dichotomy between military and civilian power, as it had been applied to the EU's external policies. He claimed that "by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power, it is possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power". 14 He argued that one of the problems with the notions of civilian and military power was "their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks"
and considered that they "need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a Again, all of this was written prior to the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. However, Manners's analysis was not confined to defining the concept of normative power in the rather abstract sense above.
He digged deeper into the EU's normative foundations, identifying five "core" norms within the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique. Those norms, he argued, were (1) the centrality of peace; (2) the idea of liberty; (3) democracy; (4) the rule of law; and (5) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He further suggested four "minor" norms, but admitted that they were much more contested. Those norms were (1) social solidarity, (2) anti-discrimination, (3) sustainable development and (4) The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. Thus my presentation of the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it -that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it -that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it -that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system.
Further literature on NPE has shown, however, that the concept of normative power is not straightforward -at least not for international relations scholars.
The debate is in large measure about the meaning of "normative". that the emphasis placed on law is an indicator of normative power: "A true normative power would bind not only others but also itself to collective rules". 28 Again, however, it could be said that there are many other international actors which aim to exercise such normative power.
It is in this reflection on normative power that legal doctrine and scholarship may be able to assist, as notions of normativity are at the heart of law and legal systems. Put simply, the normativity of NPE could be regarded to be constitutionally normative, in the legal sense: the EU is required to act externally in accordance with its own constitutionally determined normative basis, i.e. its values and objectives. In Manners's terms, that idea would not answer the positive question -whether the EU acts as a normative power.
But it is highly relevant to the ontological and normative questions -whether the EU is a normative power, and whether it ought to act as one. Furthermore, legal doctrine and scholarship may also assist in further defining the concept of "normative" in NPE, and in identifying the relevant norms as well as To begin with, it is not obvious that litigation before the EU's own court would constitute a meaningful form of enforceability of the EU's values and objectives. In particular as regards external action, it could be argued that genuine enforcement ought to be located at the international judicial level, because of the stronger guarantees of independence offered by an "external" judiciary. However, there are few avenues at present for such external judicial control, though that may change once the EU joins the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
There may be further concerns as to the relevance of internal, CJEU judicial control. There may well be a gap between the concept of enforceability, and its practical relevance. It may be easy to show that, in principle, respect for the EU's values and objectives is judicially enforceable; but whether such enforceability makes an empirically demonstrable contribution to such respect is another matter. Questions may also arise as to the "thickness" of enforceability, and the potential for tension between the different values and objectives. Is not their general character such that their enforceability may not be very meaningful for hard decisions and the daily practice of external action.
But even with those questions and doubts in mind, the inquiry into judicial enforceability before the CJEU continues to be useful, for a number of reasons. One of those is that the strong rule-of-law dimension of the EU is not just a lofty ideal which the Treaties uphold, but is a reality in day-to-day is to some degree a function of this strong rule-of-law dimension, and therefore unavoidable. That is not to say that all of the case law excels in terms of constitutional quality and rigour. The critique that some of the judgments may be too complicated may well be justified. But the blame of judicialization, also of EU external policies, cannot be laid at the door of the CJEU: it is a function of the detailed and prolific Treaties which the Member
States have drafted; of the wide scope of EU external action, in particular of a normative kind (it is no accident that so-called smart sanctions constitute the core of the CFSP); and of the EU's strong rule-of-law dimension. It may be added that the actual judgments of the CJEU are but the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the surface there is a panoply of legal opinions and advocacy nourished by the principles developed in the case law. In this basic sense, of extensive judicialization, there is a strong normative dimension to EU external action.
There is not much case law yet on the EU's values and objectives, in relation to external action -particulary in their Lisbon version, which for case law purposes is still quite young. Even so, there are some episodes and instances which clearly exemplify the potential for such case law to develop, and to determine the meaning of those values and objectives, and of the obligation to respect and promote them. Three of those episodes/instances are summarily recounted below. Two of them concern the requirement to respect fundamental rights; the third concerns the mandate to respect international law.
The first episode revolves around the EU's external human rights policy, more specifically the policy to include human-rights clauses in bilateral agreements which the EU concludes with third countries. 34 Those clauses were initially a response to difficulties which the (then) EC had with suspending development aid to ACP countries with regimes which grossly violated human rights, and counter-terrorism and other sanctions policies would be easier to implement if the EU institutions could simply hide behind the Security Council. And the EU's legislative agenda is not inviting the constraint of international law.
The episodes narrated here also exemplify the scope for judicial enforcement of the EU's values and objectives, as well as indicating ways in which the case law of the CJEU may contribute to NPE by, for example, requiring respect for fundamental rights and for international law, and by instituting normative dialogue with other actors such as the UN Security Council.
Some concluding remarks
The argument that the EU is primarily a normative power predates the strong constitutionalization of the EU's values and objectives through the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, that constitutionalization invites a further reflection about the normativity of these values and objectives. The NPE literature is a useful backdrop for this reflection, which ought to conducted also by legal scholars, who should take those values and objectives more seriously than has so far been the case. This paper has attempted to offer a first start, by focusing on normativity from a perspective of judicial enforceability. The preliminary conclusion is that the EU's values and objectives are meaningful to judicial discourse, and have some degree of enforceability.
This paper has not focused much on services of general economic interest, in contrast with the remainder of this volume. It is clear though that the EU's conception of such services is embedded in its value system, as confirmed by the Treaties and by the Charter. This means that the protection and, conceivably, the exportation of that conception need to be taken on board in the EU's external action. The identification of social solidarity as a norm which NPE embraces, confirms that finding.
That raises further questions about the nature of the norms which ought to promote and diffuse in its external action. Is the recognition and protection of services of general economic interest a universal norm, or is it rather a typical, internal EU norm, which the EU seeks to export? That question can also be raised with respect to other norms which form part of the EU's fundamental values system. But it is not clear whether the NPE concept requires absolute universality, as distinguishable from a concept of fundamental norms, and a fundamentally normative approach, focusing on Europe's conception of the good life; norms lending themselves to universal application without constituting the emanation of a new form of imperialism.
